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Perspective and Point of View on Affirmative Actiont
KEvIN BROWN"
Professor Bowen's article, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social
Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, explores the difficult terrain of whether
affirmative action continues to be an appropriate admissions policy for selective higher
education programs. She distributed a survey questionnaire at the Annual Biomedical
Research Conference for Minority Students held in Anaheim, California.' A total of
332 minority students completed her survey.2 Professor Bowen's survey included
students from Puerto Rico, Washington D.C., and twenty-seven states, including four
states that have banned affirmative action-California, Washington, Florida, and
Michigan.3 For analysis, Professor Bowen divided the survey responses based on
whether the students attended college in states that banned affirmative action or states
that continued to allow affirmative action.
4
According to Professor Bowen, her survey results suggest that underrepresented
minority "[s]tudents who attend schools in anti-affirmative action states find
themselves engaged in an unfriendly environment. ' '5 Despite being admitted on purely
white normative admissions standards, "these students were more likely . . . to
t Copyright © 2010 Kevin Brown.
* Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law and Emeritus
Director of Hudson & Holland Scholars Program (HHSP), Indiana University- Bloomington.
B.S., 1978, Indiana University; J.D., 1982, Yale University. From August 2004 to August 2008,
I directed HHSP, which was a scholarship program that recruited high achieving
underrepresented minority students to the Bloomington campus of Indiana University. In fall
2008, there were almost 600 students in the program, including approximately half of the black
and half of the Hispanic/Latino students who will graduate from the Bloomington campus. I
want to express my thanks to my older brother, Darrell Brown, who graduated with a Masters
Degree in Business Administration from the Kelley School of Business at Indiana University -
Bloomington, my younger brother, Dwayne Brown, who graduated from Columbia Law School,
and my daughter, Crystal Williams, who graduated from Duke Law School. All of us were
"beneficiaries" of affirmative action. In light of Professor Bowen's article, we discussed our
experiences of affirmative action at a New Year's Day family gathering and arrived at similar
conclusions to the ones I express in this Commentary.
1. The Conference was held November 8-10, 2006. Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant
Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND.
L.J. 1197, 1214-15 (2010).
2. In addition, twenty-two respondents agreed to be contacted for follow up interviews. Id.
at 1216.
3. Id. at 1217-18.
4. Although Michigan passed Proposal 2 banning affirmative action the day before
Professor Bowen's survey commenced, she included respondents from Michigan with
respondents from the other states that banned affirmative action because of the ongoing anti-
affirmative action atmosphere that had existed since 1998, when the plaintiffs in Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), filed
complaints. See Bowen, supra note 1, at 1218 n. 11. Professor Bowen also subdivided the
students into those that had one or more classes where they were the sole minority student and
those that did not experience any classes where they were the sole minority student. Id. at 1217.
5. Bowen, supra note 1, at 1234.
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encounter . . . open hostility, internal stigma, and external stigma" than their
underrepresented minority counterparts in affirmative action states. 6 What Professor
Bowen means by "internal stigma" is that underrepresented minority students admitted
on affirmative action "will always doubt their abilities and their merit.",7 These students
"will experience external stigma because other students will assume that they were
admitted based on their race and not on their merit."
8
The results of Professor Bowen's survey run counter to what she argues proponents
of eliminating affirmative action assert. According to Professor Bowen, they argue that
race-based admissions programs will lead underrepresented students to experience both
internal and external stigma and hostility from students who resent affirmative action.
9
Professor Bowen explains that the reason underrepresented minority students in states
that have affirmative action experience less hostility, internal stigma, and external
stigma is because "underrepresented minority students in 'meritocracy' states [(those
that have banned affirmative action)] must endure silencing, imposition, and
performing in white spaces at a far greater rate than their counterparts in race-based
admissions states."'
10
With regard to silencing, Professor Bowen notes that the arguments that stem from
the belief that admissions decisions should be color blind, which is dominant in the
states that ban affirmative action, masquerade as a "perspectivelessness paradigm.""1
The color-blind approach obscures the reality that whiteness operates as the
unrecognized touchstone against which all other races and ethnicities are measured.
This removes white racial identity so that everyone else is raced, except whites. Unlike
white students, however, minority students "cannot simply turn off race by not talking
about it.'' 12 Thus, the effect of the color-blind approach is to silence minority students
because worldviews based on race or ethnicity have no place.
As a supporter of affirmative action, I will not address potential criticisms of
Professor Bowen's article that opponents will discuss. I thought Professor Bowen's
discussion of the embedded "perspectivelessness paradigm" of the color-blind
arguments against affirmative action was excellent. She accurately points out that the
color-blind approach works to obscure the reality that whiteness operates as the
unrecognized touchstone against which all other races and ethnicities are measured.
She is also correct that the color-blind approach leads to a silencing of
underrepresented minority students. However, I do not believe that underrepresented
minority students attending institutions that practice affirmative action experience less
imposition or are in white spaces far less often than their underrepresented minority
6. Id.
7. Id at 1198.
8. Id. Professor Bowen also found that "[s]tudents who attended schools in anti-
affirmative action states were disproportionately more likely to be in a class in which they were
the lone minority." Id. at 1227. She found that students who took at least one class as the sole
minority student were far more likely to encounter racism from other students and faculty and
suffered much higher rates of internal and external stigma. See id. at 1227-33.
9. Id. at 1234.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1235 (citing Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Forward: Towards a Race-Conscious
Pedagogy in Legal Education, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 33 (1994)).
12. Id.
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counterparts attending school in states that ban affirmative action. Thus, I agree with
part of Professor Bowen's explanation for the results of her study. Nevertheless, the
weakness of Professor Bowen's explanation comes from an embedded assumption that
underrepresented minorities, such as African Americans, are not active in producing
their own interpretations of their experiences in American society, including their
experiences of being on affirmative action. As a result, she misses some important
aspects of the nature of underrepresented minorities' experience with affirmative
action.
Before addressing the major shortcomings of Professor Bowen's article, I want to
provide a little autobiographical information. I would have been a perfect subject for
Professor Bowen's study because I had the experience of attending law school for the
first year as a black student who did not "benefit" from affirmative action and for the
last two years as one who did. I will start by contrasting my experiences in the two law
schools that I attended. Then I will address my two major criticism of Professor
Bowen's interpretation of her survey results. These criticisms point to her lack of
understanding of how underrepresented minority groups, such as African Americans,
have a different way of understanding their experiences on affirmative action from the
generally accepted understanding of affirmative action provided by Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger.
13
I. MY EXPERIENCE ATTENDING LAW SCHOOL AS A BLACK STUDENT WHO WAS
BOTH A NON-BENEFICIARY AND A BENEFICIARY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In 1978, I graduated with a 3.64 GPA from the Kelley School of Business at
Indiana University-Bloomington with a degree in Accounting. I took the LSAT three
times, and my highest score put me around the seventy-fifth percentile. As strange as it
may sound, I was not aware of affirmative action when I applied to law school.
14
Deeming my LSAT score inadequate for admission to the elite law schools, I applied
only to the two public law schools in my home state, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington and Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis (IU-Indy).
Both law schools admitted me. While no black person can actually know for certain, I
have always believed that my undergraduate GPA and my LSAT scores were sufficient
to get me admitted to both law schools without benefitting from affirmative action.
A. The Experience of Attending Law School Without Affirmative Action
In 1979, I enrolled as a first-year law student at IU-Indy. I was one of only three
African American students out of about 200 full-time first-year students. 5 IU-Indy did
not have any tenure or tenure-track professors, legal writing instructors, or clinicians of
13. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
14. According to Professor Bowen, at the time of applying to college, only one-third of the
students attending schools in states that allow race-based admissions policies and only one-half
of the students attending schools in states that banned affirmative action were aware of
affirmative action policies. Id. at 1224-25.
15. IU-Indy also had a part-time night division. As a day student, I rarely interacted with
the night students. As I recall, however, there were only a couple of first-year black students in
the night division.
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color. Besides the janitors, a librarian was the only black person who worked in the
entire law school building. Needless to say, all three of us were on the best of speaking
terms with her.
On the first day of orientation, the three of us sought each other out. Afterward, we
sat together in every class, studied together for class, and ate together between classes.
None of us believed that we received any positive considerations in the admissions
process because of our race. Indeed, it was just the opposite. Our informal discussions
with upper-level black students suggested that IU-Indy had an upper limit of three
black full-time students per year.' 6 Nor did we believe that our law school wanted us to
bring, appreciated that we could bring, or was even aware that we brought a different
perspective or point of view to the classroom. The three of us often discussed among
ourselves how different our perceptions of legal issues were from the way our
professors presented them or the way our classmates discussed them. However, we
never discussed our different perceptions, which were based on our racial backgrounds,
in the classroom. It was clear from the very first day of orientation that one of the
unstated presumptions of our legal education was that the experiences of African
Americans were simply not relevant to legal discussions.
As is still done by many law schools today, the Black Law Students Association
conducted an informal orientation for the three of us. During that meeting, our well-
meaning second- and third-year advisors told us that all we should hope for were
grades of C, C+, and, if we were lucky, B-. They did not tell us to pursue membership
on law review, participate in the activities of the law student association, or seek out
research-assistant positions with professors. What we should do is seek to survive,
graduate, and pass the bar. At the end of the road, we should be able to find a job with
some governmental agency or join a small office of black lawyers where we would
share expenses and receive additional legal training on the practicalities of making a
living as a solo practitioner.
B. The Experience of Attending Law School with Affirmative Action
Despite the obstacles that the three of us encountered at IU-Indy, my first-year
grades and those of one of my other black colleagues 17 put us in the top two percent of
the class. After the first year, I applied for and was admitted to Yale Law School as a
transfer student in fall 1980. I firmly believe that without affirmative action, Yale Law
School would not have admitted me.
16. My experience is that of an African American attending IU-Indy in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, and IU-Indy long ago began to seek out underrepresented minority students. I am
proud to tell people I attended IU-Indy as a first-year student because it is an outstanding law
school with an exceptional faculty and student body. This Comment in no way reflects on the
current faculty of IU-Indy or the experiences of underrepresented minority students who have
enrolled at IU-Indy for many years.
17. Alan Mills would later go on to be the first person of color to join the Indiana Law
Review and was awarded the Faculty Prize as the most outstanding graduate. He was the first
person of color to work as an attorney for Barnes & Thornburg-one of Indiana's most
prestigious law firms. Alan is also the first racial minority partner at Barnes & Thornburg and
has served on the management committee of the firm. A copy of his firm biography is available
at http://www.btlaw.com/Person.asp?PersonnelID=48.
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In contrast to being one of three black students, I was one of eleven at Yale, in a
class of about the same size. While most (though not all) of us made a point of
interacting with each other, we also were very involved in law school activities. For
example, Randall Kennedy was a member of the Yale Law Journal. Robert Vance was
the Articles and Topic Editor for the Yale Journal of World Public Order.8 While
Yale did not have any classes that presented a minority perspective on important legal
issues, Robert Cover devoted a lot of time in his legal history class to the atrocities of
slavery. Charles Black (one of the attorneys who litigated Brown v. Board of
Education)'9 talked often about the evils of segregation and the need to overcome the
legacy of discrimination in American society in his Constitutional Law class. Paul
Gewirtz not only taught a course entitled Antidiscrimination Law, but also taught a
seminar that focused primarily on the issue of school desegregation. Thus, not only did
a number of professors address issues of specific importance to African Americans in
the classroom, but they also presented them in a sympathetic light.
Two black professors, Drew Days and Harlon Dalton, joined the faculty during my
time at Yale and were instantly important role models for all the black students at the
Yale Law School. Black students looked up to these faculty members and were grateful
for their presence. The Dean of Admissions, James Thomas, was also black. With
regard to the job market, the very same Indianapolis law firms that I had sent my
resume to in June, and from whom I received no response, came to Yale Law School
and interviewed me in September.
II. PROFESSOR BOWEN'S EXPLANATION OF MY EXPERIENCE, THOUGH PARTIALLY
CORRECT, Is FAR FROM ADEQUATE
From my experience as a black law student who was both a nonbeneficiary and a
beneficiary of affirmative action, I clearly felt less hostility and less external stigma at
Yale than I did at IU-Indy.20 Professor Bowen would say that the reasons I felt less
hostility and less external stigma at Yale than at IU-Indy was because I endured less
silencing, imposition, and performing in white spaces at Yale than at IU-Indy.2 1 1 agree
that I felt less silenced at Yale because there were more times in the classroom and
outside the classrooms for discussions of worldviews based on race or ethnicity.
However, it is untenable to suggest that I endured less imposition or was in white
spaces less at Yale than I was at IU-Indy.
Simply put, the lessened hostility and external stigma I experienced cannot be fully
explained by a reduction in silencing. Affirmative action is a welcome mat to
underrepresented minority students who are not prepared or able to abandon their race
or ethnicity at the schoolhouse door. In addition, it is also important to understand
something that Professor Bowen did not adequately appreciate. The silencing that
18. Masthead, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. v (1981).
19. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIvIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 50 (1994).
20. I probably felt more internal stigma at Yale than at IU-Indy, but that was because I
perceived the white students at Yale as more qualified than those at IU-Indy, not because I was
a beneficiary of afflirmative action. In this regard, I doubt that my feelings were different from
those any law student would experience, regardless of race, ethnicity, or affirmative action.
21. Bowen, supra note 1, at 1235.
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occurs among underrepresented minority students because of the color-blind approach
to education-whether in institutions that have affirmative action or ones that do not-
is limited. The silencing that I experienced in the classroom and in interactions with the
majority students and professors did not occur when black students discussed our law
school experiences among ourselves. At Yale, we had another way of understanding
affirmative action than the way articulated by Justice Powell and, later, Justice
O'Connor. This alternative interpretation rejected the color-blind interpretation of the
easily measurable academic credentials of LSAT scores and undergraduate grade point
averages and thereby changed the way we comprehended the external stigma we
encountered.
A. Affirmative Action Is a Welcome Mat, Not a "Quiet Please" or "Do Not
Disturb " Sign
Affirmative action is not legally mandated. Thus, selective higher education
programs have to decide whether they will implement affirmative action. Some
members of the faculty and/or the administration have to conclude, for whatever
reasons, that their institutions should take account of race and ethnicity in its
admissions decisions. They must see some greater benefit from having black and
brown students in their student bodies than a color-blind interpretation of easily
measurable academic credentials of standardized test scores or grade point averages
alone would produce. As a result, a selective higher education institution that employs
affirmative action conveys the message to underrepresented minorities that they are
valued not in spite of, but because of the fact that they are underrepresented
minorities. 22 This welcome mat conveys a far different (and for an underrepresented
minority student a far more welcoming) message than the message conveyed to us by
institutions that do not have or cannot employ affirmative action. The latter institutions
are saying that we accept you as an individual who happens to be black or brown, but
not as a black or brown individual. In other words, we accept you as an exception from
your underrepresented racial or ethnic group, not as a member of it. This was a major
reason that I felt less hostility and more acceptance at Yale than at IU-Indy. As an
African American, I perceived myself crossing over a welcome mat as I entered Yale
due to the affirmative action policy. At IU-Indy, in contrast, I perceived myself
passing by a "Quiet Please" or a "Do Not Disturb" sign posted outside the front door as
I entered. Thus, as I walked into Yale Law School, I walked into a place in which I
perceived less hostility because I was an African American than I did when I walked
into IU-Indy.
B. Understanding Affirmative Action from the Perspective of an Underrepresented
Minority Group with a History of Discrimination
I, like most African Americans (student or faculty), encounter silencing, imposition,
and the requirement to perform in white spaces in predominately white higher
22. Cf Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision to treat affirmative action programs the
same as programs that discriminated against racial minorities was to "disregard the difference
between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat").
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education institutions whether they have affirmative action or not. In these regards,
predominately white higher education institutions that profess a commitment to
affirmative action are better, but only marginally better, than predominately white
institutions that have no such commitment. From my experience, very few of the
selective higher education programs that embrace affirmative action have
institutionalized a celebration of diversity and multiple points of view, especially in the
classroom.
I write regularly in the area of race, law, and education and have written about
affirmative action several times. 3 I am very aware of the justifications for affirmative
action first articulated by Justice Powell in his 1978 opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke24 and followed by Justice O'Connor in her 2003
opinion for the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger.2 5 Both opinions accepted the racial
neutrality of the easily measurable meritocratic credentials of standardized test scores
and undergraduate grade point averages. However, both concluded that the benefits of
diversity justified the use of racial classifications in an individualized admissions
process. 26 Under Justice Powell's and Justice O'Connor's opinions, begrudging
supporters of affirmative action are suppose to swallow hard, hold their noses, and
tolerate affirmative action, even though they perceive it as an exception to meritocracy.
Affirmative action is the lesser of two evils. While it requires a deviation from
meritocracy, it is, nevertheless, preferable to having almost no underrepresented
minorities in the student body.
Justice Powell's and Justice O'Connor's opinions bear constitutional imprimatur.
They provide the legal rationale that selective higher education programs that wish to
employ affirmative action must articulate in order to justify their decision. I am certain
that there are underrepresented minority students who understand affirmative action
consistent with Justice Powell's and Justice O'Connor's opinions. Applying the color-
blind interpretation of their easily measurable academic credentials to their own
experiences, these underrepresented minority students could come to understand their
admittance as the result of unearned positive considerations because of their race or
ethnicity. These underrepresented minority individuals would, presumably, conclude
that because their easily measurable academic credentials are below those of the
overwhelming majority of the students admitted, they are not as qualified or as worthy
of being a member of the student body. Therefore, these underrepresented minority
students would feel some type of internalized sense of stigma generated by being a
recipient of affirmative action and, probably, would perceive that fellow students
23. See, e.g., Kevin D. Brown, After Grutter v. Bollinger-Revisiting the Desegregation
Era from the Perspective of the Post-Desegregation Era, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 41 (2004);
Kevin Brown, The Hypothetical Opinion in Grutter v. Bollingerfrom the Perspective of the
RoadNot Taken in Brown v. Board of Education, 36 Loy. U. Cin. L.J. 83 (2004); Kevin Brown,
The Road Not Taken in Brown: Recognizing the Dual Harm of Segregation, 90 VA. L. REV.
1579 (2004); Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action
and the Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher Educational
Institutions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229 (2008).
24. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
26. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 344,370-75 (2003); Bakke,
438 U.S. at 314-15.
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viewed them as less qualified to be in the student body as well. The less that these
underrepresented minorities find themselves in white spaces, presumably, the less they
would encounter the negative feelings related to internal and external stigma. Thus,
Professor Bowen's explanation of her survey results is one viable interpretation.
However, this interpretation implies that underrepresented minority students are
limited to the race-neutral interpretation of their academic credentials asserted by
Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor in understanding our admittance to selective
higher education institutions. In other words, Professor Bowen seems to think that we
accept the color-blind interpretation of our academic credentials as the only viable
interpretation for awarding positive considerations to underrepresented minorities in
the admissions process.
The diversity justification for concluding that a critical mass of underrepresented
minorities with a history of discrimination would enrich the academic environment for
all students implies that there are alternative explanations for important social
phenomena, including affirmative action, than the dominant one. As an African
American, I come from a people who, against the background of 390 years of racial
domination in the United States, formulated a counter discourse to explain our
experiences and our condition in American society. This counter interpretation rejects
the long held belief of dominant mainstream American culture, whether explicit or-in
the case of the color-blind perspective-implicit that we were or are somehow inferior.
Rather it views the sons and daughters of the soil of Africa as oppressed, not inferior.
27
Therefore, this perspective does not comprehend racial and ethnic differences in such
statistics as family income, family wealth, unemployment, political power, educational
attainment, or even standardized test scores as a reflection of our lack of ability. Within
the perspective of this counter interpretation, these regrettable differences represent
tangible proof of the continuing impact of past and present racism upon African
Americans.
As Professor Bowen points out, the color-blind approach not only silences
underrepresented minority students, but also prevents white students from seeing how
their race privileges them with an invisible package of unearned assets to which they
remain oblivious, but upon whose presence they can rely. Viewing affirmative action
within the counter interpretation that is the product of the historical discrimination that
blacks (and other underrepresented minority students) have suffered in America, one
becomes fully aware of the privileging of whites and the racism embedded within the
color-blind interpretation of easily measurable academic credentials.
As an African American law student (and faculty member), I learned not to give
much credence to the interpretation that the easily measurable academic credentials of
undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores were racially neutral. I recognized that this was,
and still is, the interpretation of affirmative action articulated by the controlling
opinions of the Supreme Court. However, I also firmly believe that the limitations on
the ability of Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor to comprehend affirmative action
from our point of view should not be the limitation that I, as an African American,
should accept on my understanding of my experience of affirmative action. African
27. For a more complete explanation of this counter discourse, see KEVIN BRowN, RACE,
LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA: FouR PERSPECTIVES ON
DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION 73-101 (2005).
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Americans encounter racial obstacles in their academic pursuits that white and Asian
students do not. This is something that, as an African American, I am well aware of,
even if Justice Powell or Justice O'Connor-unlike Justice Douglas in DeFunis v.
Odegaard2s -were not. Any casual examination of racial and ethnic socioeconomic
statistics comparing differences between African Americans or Hispanic/Latinos on the
one hand with whites or Asians on the other reveals the impact of race and ethnicity on
the lives of people in America. For underrepresented minority students, race and
ethnicity generally matter in a very negative way.29 Admissions committees should
consider race and ethnicity when making admissions decisions, regardless of the
benefits of diversity. To ignore race and ethnicity when evaluating the academic
credentials of underrepresented minorities significantly undervalues their academic
merit.30 Just as importantly, it overvalues the academic merit of whites and Asians.
From my days as a law student over thirty years ago, I recognized the glaring and
racist fallacy ofthose like Barbara Grutter who, given their easily measurable academic
credentials, like to assert, "If I had been black, I would have been admitted." First,
such an assertion is tantamount to saying that if I were black, I would be considerably
better than the best of blacks admitted, a remark that many African Americans
justifiably find extremely insulting. Such a person also appears to be oblivious to the
privilege she received by being white or Asian, a privilege that underrepresented
minorities see operating everyday. These would-be black Barbra Grutters ignore the
simple reality that Comel West so aptly pointed to when he entitled his book Race
Matters.3 1 If these Barbara Grutters had actually grown up black in America, their
entire lives would have been different. They would have played with different toys,
watched different television programs, listened to different radio stations, gone to
different movies, worshipped in different churches, lived in different neighborhoods,
attended different schools, eaten different foods, taken different elective classes, been
present at different family gatherings, cheered for different heroes, cursed different
villains, and read different newspapers, magazines, and books. The differences in their
experiences would have affected these would-be black Barbra Grutters in profound
ways, and their academic credentials would be among the most negatively affected
aspects of their lives.
I understand affirmative action as a way to try and recognize the academic merit of
underrepresented minority students in a manner that easily measurable academic
credentials cannot. As a faculty member I say this to all law students, including
underrepresented minority law students, who listen. With regard to my being a
28. 416 U.S. 312, 336 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (concluding that the case
challenging the affirmative action program at the University of Washington Law School "should
be remanded for a new trial to consider, inter alia, whether the established LSATs should be
eliminated so far as racial minorities are concerned").
29. These obstacles are separate and distinct from those related to socioeconomic hurdles
and obstacles.
30. This is the basic argument made by the brief in Grutter filed by Kimberly James, a
black student at the University of Michigan. See Response to the Petition for Certiorari by
Respondents Kimberly James et al., at 8-12, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241). For
confirmation that Kimberly James is a black student at the University of Michigan, see Motion
to Intervene at 2, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241).
31. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATrERS (2001).
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"beneficiary" of affirmative action, I did not and do not feel that I received some
unearned academic benefit because of my race. Rather, Yale Law School admitted me
based solely on merit; however, its enlightened definition of merit rejected the color-
blind approach to easily measurable academic credentials.
If higher education institutions employ affirmative action, then underrepresented
minorities will also have access to a competing meritocratic interpretation of why they
should receive additional positive considerations in the admissions process. They
receive it because some members of the faculty or administration also believe that,
regardless of the benefits of diversity, these students have earned the right of admission
based solely on their academic merit. As a result, underrepresented minority students
are aware that some supporters of affirmative action view all underrepresented
minorities as legitimate citizens of the classroom who earned their way into the student
body like everyone else, regardless of the benefits of diversity. This counter
interpretation of affirmative action-which I would contend is just as valid, though not
the accepted legal justification, as the one articulated by Justice O'Connor--eliminates
any internal stigma that an underrepresented minority on affirmative action would
experience and alters the comprehension of the external stigma they encounter from
other students (and faculty).32 Whatever external stigma underrepresented minority
students encounter from other students and some faculty members, it can be understood
as a product of lack of understanding by their fellow classmates (and some faculty
members).
CONCLUSION
There is much that I liked about Professor Bowen's article. The conclusion of her
study, that underrepresented minority students who attend schools in anti-affirmative
action states encounter more open hostility, internal stigma, and external stigma than
their underrepresented minority counterparts in affirmative action states, was
something I have known for thirty years. Professor Bowen would argue that the
explanation for this is that underrepresented minorities in states that ban affirmative
action endure silencing, imposition, and performing in white spaces at a far greater
rate. While I agree that there is more silencing, it is untenable to assert that
underrepresented minorities attending predominately white higher education
institutions in affirmative action states endure less imposition and have less need to
perform in white spaces than those in anti-affirmative action states. Lessened hostility
and external stigma cannot fully be explained by a reduction in silencing.
32. What the late Professor John Calmore stated of critical race theory is applicable to
affirmative action as well.
As [we] confront the texts of America's dominant legal, social, and cultural strata,
we are critical, fundamentally so, because we engage these texts [O'Connor's
opinion in Grutter] in a manner that counters their oppressive and subordinating
features. In this endeavor we are not simply in opposition; we are not rebels
without a cause. We are the 'new interpreters,' who demand of the dominant
institutions a new validity ....
John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic
Intelletual Life in a Mulitcultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2164 (1992).
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As a black former law student who was both a non-beneficiary and a beneficiary of
affirmative action, I believe two other explanations provide a better rationale for the
results of Professor Bowen's survey. First, an affirmative action program is a welcome
mat for underrepresented minority students. It conveys a very different message to
these students than the message conveyed by institutions that do not or cannot
implement affirmative action. The message affirmative action policies convey to
underrepresented minority students is that "we want you as a member of our student
body because you are an underrepresented minority." In contrast, the message
conveyed without affirmative action is that "we accept you in spite of the fact that you
are underrepresented minority." For black and brown students, who cannot leave their
race and ethnicity behind, the latter message is tantamount to seeing "Quiet Please"
and "Do Not Disturb" signs on the front door.
Second, the benefits of diversity spoken of first by Justice Powell and later by
Justice O'Connor are not the only way to understand why admissions committees
should take account of race and ethnicity in the admissions process. While the Supreme
Court's justifications for affirmative action presume the race neutrality of easily
measurable academic credentials, underrepresented minorities encounter racial and
ethnic obstacles in their academic pursuits that white and Asian students do not. These
racial and ethnic obstacles explain the underrepresentation of these minority groups in
the first place. Regardless of the benefits of diversity, admissions committees should
consider race and ethnicity in making admissions decisions in order to take into
account these obstacles. Under this counter interpretation, underrepresented minorities
will not feel the same amount of internal stigma they would feel if they accepted a race
neutral interpretation of their academic credentials. Additionally, when they encounter
hostility or external stigma from other students and faculty members, they will perceive
these individuals as simply ignorant of the obstacles they encounter and the privileging
majority students receive through the assumption that easily measurable academic
credentials are racially neutral.
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